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Abstract: Since the 1970s, budget 
constraints and debates over the 
tank’s relevance have prompted 
the Canadian Forces (CF) to pursue 
lighter, cheaper, and more flexible 
vehicles. The Light Armoured Vehicle 
(LAV), built in London, Ontario, has 
been purchased in great numbers 
to satisfy these demands, and it 
has largely succeeded. The CF has 
purchased the LAV as a wheeled, 
multi-purpose vehicle to fulfill a 
variety of roles (infantry carrier, 
medical evacuation vehicle, etc.), 
that is cheaper and easier to maintain 
than tracked alternatives. The CF has 
continued to purchase LAVs because 
they have been successful in the field, 
and they support a domestic producer, 
General Dynamics Land Systems 
Canada (GDLS-C), that cooperates 
closely with the military.
The Success of the Light 
Armoured Vehicle
Frank Maas
The seeds for Canada’s purchase of the Light Armoured Vehicle 
(LAV) lie as far back as 1964, when 
the Defence White Paper called for 
the creation of a force equipped with 
a flexible, light, and air-transportable 
vehicle to serve in UN missions. This 
resulted in a confused reaction that 
saw the Canadian Forces (CF) looking 
for a replacement tank for their troops 
in NATO while also trying to find a 
vehicle to serve with the UN, while 
the government was not willing to 
make the investment to procure either 
type.1 Sean Maloney argues that the 
1971 Defence White Paper, Defence 
in the 70s, released by the Trudeau 
government, was the turning point 
in the shift from tracked to wheeled 
vehicles in the CF.2 The salient point 
was that the existing armoured 
vehicles were nearing the end of 
their operational life and the military 
had to have multi-purpose vehicles 
that could reduce the pressure on 
a limited defence budget.3 This was 
combined with a growing sense in 
Canada that the nation should avoid 
high-intensity combat and focus on 
humanitarian operations, and the 
tank was not seen as a suitable vehicle 
for these operations. Moreover, the 
devastation of Israel’s tank forces 
by modern anti-tank weapons in 
the Yom Kippur War of 1973 caused 
many to doubt the tank’s primacy 
on the battlefield and whether it was 
worth the high cost for such a one-
dimensional vehicle.4 In this context, 
the Trudeau government purchased 
114 Leopard I tanks in 1978 to replace 
the 500 Centurions procured by the 
Canadian Army in the 1950s,5 but 
the Army still needed a vehicle for 
the reserves.
 Faced with the urgent need for 
new vehicles and uncertainty about 
the nature of future operations, the 
Canadian military tried to choose a 
flexible vehicle.6 With a shrinking 
defence budget, economy was an 
important reason why in 1974 the CF 
decided to pursue wheeled, light, and 
multi-purpose vehicles. The contract 
seemed destined to go to the American 
light armoured vehicle manufacturer 
Cadillac-Gage, but the owner of 
Swiss firm MOWAG, Walter Ruf, 
came to the Department of National 
Defence (DND) in Ottawa to present 
his company’s new vehicle design, 
the “Piranha.”7 DND indicated that 
the vehicle must be built in Canada to 
have a chance of winning the bid, and 
the Swiss company solicited Diesel 
Division General Motors (DDGM), 
which had no military experience, 
but manufactured heavy equipment, 
to do assembly and steel fabrication 
work at their plant in London if 
the Piranha was selected. A multi-
national competition was launched 
in 1976 for the Armoured Vehicle 
General Purpose (AVGP) program, 
a six-wheeled vehicle with four 
variants, and the Piranha was selected 
in March 1976 for the contract. Only 
three variants were produced: the 
Grizzly infantry carrier, the Cougar 
fire support vehicle, and the Husky 
maintenance vehicle. These vehicles 
were lightly armoured compared 
to tanks, and were intended to be 
training vehicles that might conduct 
peacekeeping or internal security 
operations. Production began in 
1977, and DDGM assembled the 
vehicle and manufactured large steel 
components.
 A total of 269 Grizzlies were 
built for the AVGP program and the 
vehicle was used mainly for reserves 
training in its prime role as an 
infantry carrier. Some units have been 
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life-extended to serve 
alongside the later 
Coyote and LAV-III 
as maintenance and 
recovery vehicles in 
Afghanistan.8 The 195 
Cougars delivered 
were equipped with a 
76 mm main gun and 
a 7.62 mm machine 
g u n  t o  s u p p o r t 
infantry,9 and these 
vehicles were given 
to reserve armoured 
r e g i m e n t s ,  b u t 
some were pressed 
into peacekeeping 
missions. There were 
27 Huskies built and 
these maintenance 
and recovery vehicles 
still see active service 
in that  role. 10 All 
t h e  A V G P  u n i t s 
were from ten to 13 
tonnes, with armour 
protection designed 
to withstand fire up 
to a 7.62 mm machine 
gun. 11 
 The AVGP vehicles 
were welcomed by the 
reserves.12 The First 
Hussars regimental 
history described 
t h e  C o u g a r  a s  a 
“godsend” because it 
was a credible tank-
trainer in contrast 
to the machine-gun 
armed jeeps  that 
had been used; it 
improved the morale 
a n d  r e t e n t i o n  o f 
personnel.13 Corporal 
Mark Fitz-Gerald of 
the First Hussars, 
who has deployed 
t o  A f g h a n i s t a n , 
told the author that 
basic maintenance 
was easy; drivers 
could  access  the 
engines quickly and 
do much of the basic work. Chief 
Warrant Officer Jonathan Kisslinger 
of the same unit, who served in 
Bosnia in 1994 and more recently in 
Afghanistan, added that cleaning of 
the weapons systems was also easy. 
 There were, however, significant 
shortcomings. Fitz-Gerald described 
the AVGPs as being physically tight 
– for example, the turret was cramped 
in the Cougar, and maps, binoculars, 
and other equipment cluttered the 
space. The smell was often bad, as 
soldiers in heavy uniforms sweated 
and the fumes of weapons discharges 
filled the turret. Infantry in the Grizzly 
were crowded in the back, and jostled 
because the suspension of AVGP 
units was primitive compared to later 
vehicles. The vision ports were often 
blocked, and there were no cameras 
to give infantry points of reference. 
Fitz-Gerald stated that riding in the 
back of the AVGP was nauseating, 
especially when training runs lasted 
up to two hours. Deployment was 
difficult because infantry had to 
scramble out of small doors in the 
back, and were disoriented from the 
lack of reference points within the 
vehicle. The AVGP did not have any 
air conditioning, which made the 
vehicle very uncomfortable in hot 
weather.14 Kisslinger said that there 
was limited exterior vision when 
the vehicle was “hatches down,” 
as Army doctrine dictates, during 
combat. Staying coordinated and 
in line with the other vehicles was 
difficult. The Cougar’s gun was not 
stabilized, and the vehicle had to be 
fully stopped or moving slowly for 
it to fire accurately. Having only two 
steerable wheels hampered the ability 
of the AVGP to turn in rutted roads 
or bad conditions, and also caused 
uneven weight dispersal. 
 Cougars were deployed to 
Somalia and Bosnia, and came under 
serious criticism for lack of armour 
protection, mobility, and firepower, 
hardly surprising in view of their 
design for training and low intensity 
operations.15 The vehicles were sent 
Top: Three variants of the Armoured Vehicle General Purpose 
(AVGP), a six-wheeled vehicle, were introduced into Canadian 
service in 1976. (l. to r.)  the Cougar fire support vehicle, the Grizzly 
infantry carrier, and the Husky maintenance vehicle.
Bottom: Cougar armoured vehicles from the Kelowna- and Vernon-
based British Columbia Dragoons drive through the early morning 
light and dust. The Cougars are in the US Army training area of 
Yakama, Washington as  part of Exercise Cougar Salvo held in 
March 2004.
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into active service with few spare 
parts because as training vehicles, 
they did not require the same level of 
maintenance as a front-line vehicle.16 
Kisslinger, nevertheless, emphasized 
that the Cougar showed considerable 
robustness in Bosnia. Its armour was 
generally proof against 7.62 mm 
bullets (depending on where they 
struck the vehicle and from what 
range), and the vehicle’s high speed 
offered a degree of protection from 
anti-vehicle weapons. They also 
survived mine-blasts.17
 After the success of the AVGP 
in Canada, the federal government 
suggested that DDGM look to 
export the Piranha to capitalize on 
its new plant in London.18 DDGM 
made strong sales, to the United 
States Marine Corps, Saudi Arabian 
National Guard, Australia, and New 
Zealand, in addition to continued 
orders from the Canadian Forces. In 
1999 Diesel Division General Motors 
of Canada was renamed GM Defence 
in recognition of its expanded 
military business responsibilities. 
Then, in 2003 after its acquisition by 
General Dynamics, it became General 
Dynamics Land Systems – Canada 
(DGLS-C).19
 It was Canadian needs that drove 
the most significant development of 
the AVGP, the LAV-III. As always, 
financial considerations played a 
leading part. With the end of the Cold 
War, the Canadian government was 
particularly determined to realize 
a “peace dividend” in the face of 
soaring budget deficits. This was the 
reason for the precipitate withdrawal 
of Canadian Forces in Europe starting 
in 1992. Although the 1994 Defence 
White Paper noted dangerous 
volatilities in the international 
situation following the Cold War, 
its main theme was the need for 
economy and flexibility: “In short, the 
maintenance of multi-purpose forces 
represents a pragmatic, sensible 
approach to defence at a time of fiscal 
restraint.” 20 The White Paper stated 
emphatically that Canada could 
not afford specialized equipment, 
and would only purchase what 
was absolutely necessary and easily 
maintainable.21
 T w o  o f  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s 
highlighted in the White Paper were 
renewal of the ageing fleet of tracked 
armoured personnel carriers and the 
replacement of the old Cougars.22 
The most recent American tracked 
fighting vehicles, the M1 Abrams 
main battle tank and the M2 Bradley 
infantry fighting vehicle, were too 
expensive. MOWAG had developed 
the Piranha III from 1994-1995, which 
was a much larger version of the 
vehicle with a greater payload, better 
armour and an improved suspension 
and engine.23 With Canada’s previous 
purchase of the AVGP and other LAV 
CFJIC ISD01-1018, Photo by Sgt Gerry Pilote
Above right: Grizzly and Husky armoured 
vehicles arrive in Dakar, Senegal aboard 
a Dutch commercial ship, 12 August 
2005. Canada provided 105 armoured 
vehicles, training and maintenance 
assistance, and personal protective 
equipment in support of the efforts of 
the African Union Mission in Sudan 
(AMIS) to bring peace and stability to the 
Darfur region. The 100 “Grizzly” general 
purpose armoured vehicles and five 
“Husky” armoured recovery vehicles are 
being used by AU troops from Nigeria, 
Rwanda and Senegal.  
Below right: Members of the 3rd 
Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment (3 R22eR) 
depart the Canadian platoon house in 
their Grizzly infantry section vehicle for 
their daily patrol, 12 November 2001. 
The 3 R22eR Battlegroup is with Task 
Force Bosnia-Herzegovina on Roto 9 
of Operation PALLADIUM, Canada’s 
contribution to the NATO Stabilization 
Force (SFOR).
CFJIC IS2005-3031, Photo by Marc Lacourse
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variants, the political and financial 
contexts,  and most important, 
Canada’s production capability, 
the selection of the LAV-III was a 
predictable choice. DND decided on 
a directed purchase of the vehicle (no 
competition for the contract), which 
meant that the government could 
avoid the media scrutiny of a costly 
and time-consuming competition for 
a multi-billion dollar contract.24
 An advantage of  the wel l 
established relationship between 
DDGM and the Canadian Forces was 
that DDGM could pick and choose 
from the advances that MOWAG 
designers had developed in light 
of the CF’s particular needs and 
preferences. According to William 
Pettipas, a former executive director 
of GM Diesel, the strength of MOWAG 
was research and development, while 
DDGM was better at integrated 
vehicle design,  especially the 
cost-effective implementation of 
upgrades. The two companies could 
operate profitably without each 
other, but could cooperate closely 
when needed.25 
 The CF’s purchase was the 
first sale of the LAV-III by either 
DDGM or MOWAG. Although 
wheeled armoured vehicles were 
not in vogue during the Cold War 
with larger combatants, they offered 
an attractive, cheaper alternative 
for smaller nations. The shift in 
military thinking after the Cold War 
to faster, quicker fleets adapting to 
multiple situations was beneficial 
for the company.26 Tom de Faye, 
director of marketing and business 
development, stated that the decline 
of the Soviet threat reduced the need 
for heavy armoured vehicles, but 
increased the demand for cheaper, 
more versatile vehicles.27 In the 
case of the LAV, the US Marine 
Corps, a service comparable in 
size and resources to the CF, had 
demonstrated the vehicle’s capability 
in such varied roles as air defence, 
command and communications, and 
as mortar carriers. Hopes in Canada 
were that this flexibility, together 
with the increased protection and 
firepower of the LAV-IIIs, might 
make large savings possible by 
forestalling the need to replace the 
CF’s Leopard tanks. The government 
was so cost-conscious and concerned 
about public perception of large 
investments in armoured vehicles 
that it bought the LAV-III in batches 
to hide the total cost of the program.28
 DDGM started manufacturing 
the first batch of 240 LAV-IIIs for 
the Canadian Forces in 1998, and 
a wargame that same year, “Iron 
Renaissance,” compared the LAV-III 
against the other APC of the Canadian 
Army, the M113. The study found 
that the LAV-III was much more 
effective and versatile than the M113 
despite some limitations in mobility 
Local Afghan children wave as Canadian soldiers from Task Force Kandahar pass by in a LAV III, January 2011.
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on soft ground and vulnerability 
against anti-armour weapons. In the 
study, a Canadian battlegroup fought 
against an opposing motor rifle 
regiment with Soviet-style tactics in 
a defensive and offensive battle. The 
LAV-III’s 25 mm cannon allowed it 
to engage threats at a greater range 
than the M113’s heavy machine gun, 
and the vehicle’s total enclosure of 
the crew reduced casualties because 
it protected them from artillery and 
indirect fire.29 The LAV-III’s speed, 
acceleration, and mobility, combined 
with the firepower of its 25 mm 
cannon and carrying capacity for 
specialized infantry weapons made 
it a more capable vehicle.30 Although 
the LAV-III could not manoeuvre 
easily in the presence of enemy tanks, 
it incurred fewer losses and inflicted 
greater damage on the opponent than 
the M113.31 
 The experience of Corporal 
Fitz-Gerald and Master Warrant 
Officer Kisslinger with the LAV-III 
contrasted to the AVGP usefully 
highlights developments in design 
and performance. Kisslinger said 
that the LAV-III’s hydropneumatic 
suspension was much superior to 
previous vehicles, and allowed 
operation at higher speed with 
better crew comfort. The engine was 
more powerful, and technological 
advancements, such as thermal 
imagery, self-diagnostic maintenance 
systems, and improved fire-control 
made the LAV-III  much more 
effective. The infantry compartment 
was larger, and the sergeant’s camera 
that displayed the area in front of the 
vehicle reduced disorientation among 
the embarked infantry, and allowed 
them to deploy more effectively. 
Fitz-Gerald added that the ramp 
on the vehicle was a significant 
improvement, allowing infantry to 
deploy much faster. Finally, and 
very importantly, the LAV-III has air 
conditioning, which is a significant 
advantage in hot environments.
 The LAV-III has served in low 
intensity operations of the type that 
the LAV type was originally 
designed, in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, the Balkans, and 
Haiti, but has also seen a 
great deal of combat with 
the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) 
i n  A f g h a n i s t a n . 3 2 T h e 
Canadian Army realized 
quickly that it needed heavy 
vehicles  to  combat  the 
Taliban insurgency, and 
sent additional LAV-IIIs and 
Bison armoured vehicles 
after first deploying.33 Yet the 
Taliban has used increasingly 
powerful roadside bombs 
and weapons, and no vehicle 
is immune.34 The goal of the 
insurgents is not necessarily 
to destroy the vehicle, but 
to kill the personnel inside 
it ;  the high pressure of 
large anti-tank mines or 
other bombs can savage the 
troops inside any vehicle. 
Since the middle of 2006, 
LAV-IIIs have come under 
more frequent attack by the 
and that no vehicle is immune.36 By 
mid-2008, the Army was considering 
replacing or upgrading the LAV-III, 
which has seen tough service in 
Afghanistan, and was not designed 
to meet threats like IEDs. Even so, the 
vehicle’s capabilities and versatility 
earned the confidence of its crews.37 
Kisslinger stated that the LAV-III 
is robust, well-armed and popular 
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Taliban. A Lesson Synopsis Report in 
response to an Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) from May 2009 stated 
that “no amount of armour could 
prevent a catastrophic vehicle kill,” 
and that the best method of defeating 
IEDs is in proper reconnaissance 
and route choice.35 As IED attacks 
intensified, military commanders 
reaffirmed the utility of the LAV-III 
Above right: A Coyote armoured 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e  v e h i c l e 
watches the perimeter of the 
Kandahar airfield. The mast-
mounted radar of the Coyote’s 
surveillance system scans for 
suspicious activity and can 
“see” up to 24 kilometres away. 
Photo taken in March 2002.
Below right: A Coyote provides 
overwatch at the Vancouver 
International Airport during the 
2010 Summer Olympic Games.
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with personnel; Fitz-Gerald agreed 
that the LAV-III platform and its 
technologies performed well in 
Afghanistan.38 
 GDLS-C has positioned itself 
as the sole supplier of armoured 
vehicles for the Canadian Forces, 
and has adapted itself to Canada’s 
part icular  context :  budgetary 
constraints even as the country 
undertakes international military 
missions in diverse challenging 
environments. During the AVGP bid 
of the 1970s, Army officers wanted to 
re-equip the armoured forces with 
a new main battle tank, but could 
not overcome the government’s 
unwillingness on the score of cost 
and public perceptions of tanks as 
offensive weapons inappropriate 
to Canada’s foremost international 
role as a peacekeeper. In the end 
the Army had to settle for a limited 
number of Leopard tanks, mainly 
to sustain the armoured regiment 
in Europe, and a larger number of 
wheeled tank trainers that could 
Top left: Under a flag flying at half-mast 
to mark the death of the Queen Mother, 
a Bison infantry section vehicle brings 
(from left) Vice Admiral Greg Maddison, 
the deputy chief of the defence staff, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran, the 
commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion, 
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light 
Infantry Battle Group, and Lieutenant-
General Mike Jeffrey, the chief of the 
land staff, to the Canadian camp at 
Kandahar International Airport to deliver 
a briefing to the soldiers of the 3 PPCLI 
Battle Group, 30 March 2002.
Middle left: A Canadian Forces Bison 
maintenance and recovery vehicle sits 
in a compound at night at the Canadian 
International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) camp in Kabul, Afghanistan, 13 
July 2003.
Bottom left :  An armoured Bison 
ambulance and its crew are serving 
a six-month mission maintaining 
a safe and secure environment in 
Bosnia on Operation Palladium, a NATO 
peace-support mission and Canada’s 
contribution to peace in the Balkans. 
This photo was taken in Velika Kladusa, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina on 28 May 2003.
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perform in low-intensity operations, 
such as internal security at home, and 
peace-monitoring missions for the 
UN. AVGPs were low-maintenance 
compared to tracked vehicles, 
particularly so because a common 
platform filled multiple roles; troops 
did not have to service a variety of 
vehicles. 
 The AVGPs have been in service 
for much longer than expected, and 
have been continuously rebuilt and 
re-roled. Colonel Fred Lewis boasted 
in 2004 that the Canadian Army 
was a NATO leader in converting 
to faster, wheeled fleets that could 
capitalize on enhanced intelligence 
gathering capabilities and use their 
speed to eliminate targets quickly.39 
This continuing commitment to 
wheeled vehicles as a primary 
combat type was not intended. In 
circumstances that echoed those 
that surrounded the original AVGP 
acquisition in the 1970s, the CF 
bought the LAV-III at a time of 
severe financial stress, and acute 
need for new equipment in the face 
of uncertainty about requirements 
in a rapidly changing international 
environment. DDGM’s LAV-III was 
selected in 1995 because the company 
had a strong record as a contractor for 
the Canadian Forces. They had a new, 
upgraded and capable vehicle whose 
predecessor had proven itself. There 
was commonality with many other 
vehicles in Canadian service, and 
the CF had combat and maintenance 
personnel who were already familiar 
with the LAV. The LAV-III could 
fulfill a variety of tactical roles, from 
infantry to missile carriers, and it was 
also upgradeable, which built on an 
important element of the Canadian 
Army’s relationship with the LAV 
family: “platform improvement.”40 
 The Piranha family of Light 
Armoured Vehicles manufactured in 
London, Ontario has been a successful 
military technology. Although 
the market is  demanding and 
competitive, GDLS-C has made itself 
Top: A US Army Stryker NBCRV (nuclear, biological and chemical reconnaissance 
vehicle) is an NBC testing lab on wheels. Here it is on display at the Pentagon 
in Washington, DC, December 2007.
Above: Soldiers from B Troop, 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Regiment, fire a 120 mm 
mortar from their Stryker during crew certification at Fort Lewis, Washington, 
May 2008.
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into the pre-eminent manufacturer of 
light armoured vehicles, formerly a 
European domain.41 From an original 
design nearly 40 years old, GDLS-C 
and MOWAG have progressively 
developed the armoured vehicle into 
three distinct variants with many 
capabilities. The original Piranhas 
were light vehicles, approximately 
ten tonnes, and recent updates of 
the LAV have taken it to nearly 30 
tonnes, to accommodate increases in 
firepower, protection, engine power, 
and technological innovation.42 The 
company has been successful because 
of the vehicle’s combat performance; 
the LAV has acquitted itself well 
and it is generally liked by its crews. 
There have been problems, but no 
vehicle is perfect.
 However, selling the vehicle and 
ensuring customers stay satisfied 
requires more than just having a 
good product. The foundation for 
GDLS-C’s success is its domestic 
market: Canada. The CF’s purchase 
of the AVGP was the London 
company’s foothold on the light 
armoured vehicle market, and 
subsequent purchases have cemented 
GDLS-C’s role in the Canadian 
defence establishment. DND has 
found ways to support GDLS-C 
because it is the only manufacturer 
of armoured vehicles in Canada 
and is a significant industry. Under 
Light Armoured Vehicles in foreign 
service.
Left: An Australian LAV testing its 
equipment on a practice range near 
Tallil Air Base in Southern Iraq, 
Below left: A Royal New Zealand LAV 
participates in “JOINT KIWI 08,” an 
exercise held on the South Island of 
New Zealand and aimed at improving 
interoperability with the Australian 
military.
Bottom left: United States Marine Corps 
scouts with the Light Armored Vehicle 
platoon, 15th Marine Expeditionary 
Unit take cover behind an LAV-25 prior 
to beginning a trench assault in the 
Jordanian desert during “Operation 
Infinite Moonlight,” August 2008.Australian Department of Defence (ADOD) photo  20071230adf8243116-311
ADOD photo 20080517ran8100279-175-drn
United States Marine Corps Photograph
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the Canada-US Defence Production 
Sharing Agreement, moreover, 
GDLS-C can bid on US contracts 
and be treated like a US company. 
The Canadian government has also 
actively assisted GDLS-C in selling its 
product.43 William Pettipas stated that 
“soldiers are our best salespeople,”44 
and the CF’s purchase and stamp of 
approval on the LAV has paved the 
way for large American contracts and 
other foreign sales that have helped 
the company grow.
 The second aspect of GDLS-C’s 
success is the hiring of former or 
reserve military personnel, a common 
practice among defence contractors.45 
William Pettipas was a military 
officer for 28 years before joining 
the company,46 and his first-hand 
knowledge of what soldiers need 
and expect has helped the company 
immensely. Designers, such as Mike 
Stapleton, are reservists who have 
trained and worked with LAVs, and 
are aware of the sometimes unusual 
requirements of military personnel. 
This helps them to provide solutions 
that address those requirements, and 
the connection with military culture 
and common “language” strengthens 
the understanding between the CF 
and GDLS-C. An article in the Maple 
Leaf described the experience of 
GDLS-C employee Mark Campbell, 
who is in the Army Reserves. He 
stated that the support he received 
from the company was “absolutely 
amazing,” and that GDLS-C was very 
good in accommodating its reservists 
in pay and leaves. He noted there 
are 16 employees in GDLS-C who 
are currently active in the reserves, 
and that this enhances “a strong 
understanding of military equipment 
requirements from the perspective 
of the end user.”47 William Pettipas 
agrees that the hiring of former or 
reserve military personnel is beneficial 
for the design of the vehicle as well 
as corporate relationships. Former 
military personnel at the higher levels 
of the company create understanding 
between the purchasers and the 
company, and enhance the credibility 
of the producer.48
 The LAV and GDLS-C are 
attractive because they reduce the 
maintenance burden on militaries. 
A high maintenance load can cripple 
combat efficiency and budgets, and 
the high cost of acquiring vehicles 
means that combat platforms are 
kept in service for a long time: 
sometimes up to 30 years. The LAV 
meets requirements for a reliable, 
maintainable vehicle that  can 
perform a variety of roles. GDLS-C’s 
branch plant in Edmonton and 
another workshop in London, and the 
subcontractor Militex Coatings Inc 
have done much of the refurbishment 
and reworking for these vehicles. The 
shared experience of the Canadian, 
American, Australian, New Zealand, 
and Saudi Arabian militaries reduces 
the maintenance burden in NATO or 
ABCA, and the LAV User Nations 
Group was created to build on this 
shared knowledge.49
 Finally, the LAV is upgradeable, a 
key requirement in an era of ceaseless 
change. For example, the LAV-III 
was designed in the mid-1990s 
with no anticipation of the threat 
of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Defence contractors and militaries 
have been forced to react to this 
threat, and lately, GDLS-C has 
aggressively researched survivability 
and armour upgrades to contend 
against roadside bombs.50 GDLS-C 
has produced the LAV-H, which is a 
technology demonstrator to show the 
capabilities that can be achieved with 
a refurbished LAV-III. The LAV-H 
was built with the experience and 
recommendation of former operators 
from Afghanistan.51 Improving the 
vehicle with operator experience is 
not a standardized process, rather an 
informal series of discussions with 
military personnel.52 Because it was 
designed as a troop carrier, there is 
room in the large compartment in 
non-infantry variants for electronics 
packages, or other equipment and 
weapons such as mortars.
 Since the LAV was first purchased 
in the 1970s defence budgets have 
continued to be tightly constrained 
and the military has not enjoyed 
the flexibility in procurement it 
had during the Second World War 
and the early Cold War. Rather, the 
CF must economize while being 
called upon to perform more varied 
roles, even as more lethal threats 
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Baghdad, with a column of Strykers providing support, July 2009.
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dictate the employment of new, 
costly technology. The LAV, despite 
the age of its original design, has 
been continually improved to meet 
new demands, and its producer 
has continually adapted itself to 
respond effectively to its market and 
customers.
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